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Awards: a view from psychological economics
Abstract
Awards in the form of orders, decorations, prizes, and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics,
private organizations, not-for-profit, and profit-oriented firms. This paper argues that awards present a
unique combination of different stimuli and that they are distinct and unlike other monetary and
non-monetary rewards. Despite their relevance in all areas of life awards have not received much
scientific attention. Employing a unique data set, we demonstrate that there are substantial differences in
the intensity of usage of awards across countries. Moreover, we present results on a vignette experiment
that quantifies and isolates the effects of different award characteristics such as the publicity associated
with winning an award.
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Abstract 
Awards in the form of orders, decorations, prizes, and titles are ubiquitous in 
monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit, and profit-oriented 
firms. This paper argues that awards present a unique combination of different stimuli 
and that they are distinct and unlike other monetary and non-monetary rewards. 
Despite their relevance in all areas of life awards have not received much scientific 
attention. Employing a unique data set, we demonstrate that there are substantial 
differences in the intensity of usage of awards across countries. Moreover, we present 
results on a vignette experiment that quantifies and isolates the effects of different 
award characteristics such as the publicity associated with winning an award.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Awards all over 
If an alien were to look at the social life of people here on earth, it would be stunned 
by the enormous number of awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations, prizes, 
titles and other honors. Awards are equally ubiquitous in monarchies as in staunch 
republics. In the French Republic, for instance, the légion d’honneur plays an 
important role, and 3’000 such awards are conferred annually (House of Commons, 
2004). In the United States, the President and Congress bestow medals, while at the 
same time purple hearts, bronze and silver stars are handed out quite liberally, and at 
an increasing rate in the military service (Cowen, 2000: 93). It is well known that a 
flood of orders, medals and titles (such as “Hero of the Soviet Union” or “Hero of 
Socialist Labour”) was handed out in communist countries, such as the Soviet Union 
or the German Democratic Republic.  
Awards exist not only at the national level. In the arts, culture and the media, awards 
are also of central importance. Prominent examples are the Academy Awards 
(Oscars), the prizes handed out by the film festivals at Cannes, or Berlin, the Grammy 
award for artistic significance in the field of recording, or the Brooker and Pulitzer 
Prizes in literature. In sports, athletes receive the honor of being chosen 
“Sportspersonality of the Year”, and of being admitted into one of the many Halls of 
Fame. It might be expected that in academia intrinsic interest in scientific progress 
provides all of the motivational drive needed and that awards as extrinsic and social 
stimuli are not held in high esteem. The opposite is true: academia has an elaborate 
and extensive system of awards, such as honorary doctorates, prizes such as the Fields 
Medal in mathematics or the Nobel Prizes, as well as a multitude of prestigious 
fellowships. Perhaps even more surprising is the widespread use of awards in the 
corporate sectors of market economies. Firms honor their employees as “Employee of 
the Month” or hand out “Thank you!”- or “Bravo!”-Awards; there seems no limit to 
the ingenuity to invent ever new awards.1 The media support this by creating their 
                                                 
1 In his book 1001 Ways to Reward Employees Nelson (2005) provides ample evidence of the 
number and variety of awards in companies.  
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own awards and by regularly choosing “Best Managers” (Business Week) or “CEOs 
of the Year” (Financial World).  
1.2 Literature 
The science of phaleristics has produced a large literature on specific awards, in 
particular on orders, decorations and medals. It is historically oriented and is mainly 
devoted to presenting the historical facts about individual orders as well as the rules 
according to which an order is handed out.2 Awards or related issues have been 
discussed in a considerable literature in sociology (Bourdieu (1979), Elster (1983), 
Braudy (1986), and Marmot (2004)). However, with few exceptions, these works 
mainly address awards and distinctions in a general and abstract way (and not as 
incentives), and they do not use a comparative perspective.  
The psychological literature provides important insights into the mechanisms via 
which awards work on the individual level. For an overview of this literature and a 
survey of studies investigating the effects of different stimuli see Stajkovic and 
Luthans (2003).3 However, this literature mainly focuses on isolated stimuli and is 
largely silent about the types of tasks and situations for which one can expect awards 
to be successful motivators. There are a few articles in personnel psychology that 
systematically compare the impact of different human resource practices, such as 
performance pay, praise and feedback and their various combinations, on performance 
(Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006). Awards, as bundles of these and other stimuli, 
however, have not been studied. Further psychological literatures that we use to 
develop our hypotheses below are goal setting theory (Locke, 1968), reinforcement 
theory (Skinner, 1935), social-cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), need theory 
(Maslow, 1943) including its advancements (Alderfer, 1972), motivation-hygiene 
theory (Herzberg, 1959), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), and the motivation model 
by Porter and Lawler (Porter & Lawler, 1986). 
                                                 
2 Examples of this literature are Risk (1972) on the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, or 
Galloway (2002) on the Order of St Michael and St George.  
3 The various reinforcers (stimuli) used in behavior modification in organizational settings can 
be classified into the following types of interventions: (1) financial/monetary, (2) non-
financial, (3) social, and (4) various combinations (simultaneous use) of two or more types of 
reinforcement. Awards belong to category (4). 
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The economic literature has also largely disregarded awards despite the importance of 
incentives. However, there is some literature in economics that provides insights into 
isolated aspects of awards. A typical way for (standard) economists to look at awards 
would be in terms of the signal emitted (Spence, 1974), in terms of the competition 
induced (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), and in terms of incentives in a principle-agent 
relationship in a firm (Prendergast, 1999). While these approaches are useful, they are 
hardly able to capture and reveal the many different aspects involved in the working 
of awards. In psychological economics, which combines economic methods with 
insights from psychology, certain other aspects relevant to understanding awards have 
been discussed. Of particular relevance are analyses of status incentives ((Auriol & 
Renault, 2008) and (Loch, Yaziji, & Langen, 2001)), of rewards as feedback (Sururov 
& van de Ven, 2006), of social recognition ((Brennan & Pettit, 2004) and (English, 
2005)), of reciprocity (Fehr & Gachter, 2000), and of identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 
2005).  
1.3 The nature of awards  
Awards work as incentives via a number of channels that have been shown to 
influence human behavior. Among others, awards motivate (1) because winning an 
award makes the recipient feel good about himself irrespective of monetary or status 
consequences, hence even without others knowing about the award (Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2003), (2) because awards are typically conferred by a principal whose opinion 
the agent values, (3) because of the social prestige they generate and recognition they 
bring within the peer group (Brennan & Pettit, 2004), (4) because awards are typically 
set-up as tournaments and many persons enjoy competing; i.e. working towards an 
award generates process utility (Frey, Benz, & Stutzer, 2004), and hence pleasure 
irrespective of the outcome;4 (5) because of the monetary compensation or other 
material or immaterial benefits associated with winning the awards. However, awards 
do not only work as incentives; they also work ex post. Awards create and establish 
role models, they distribute information about successful and desirable behavior 
(Bandura, 1986): 18-22), change the work environment including the prevalent norms 
and values (Dessler, 1999), create role models, and change the identities of winners 
                                                 
4 Agents, however, vary in the degree to which they find the participation in a competition 
desirable. Many studies have documented, for instance, gender differences with respect to this 
issue (Croson & Gneezy, 2005). 
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by inducing loyalty (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Depending on the specific award 
analyzed the various award channels mentioned above are salient in differing degrees. 
While the general term “award” implies that the different existing honors and prizes 
pertain to the same group of incentives, specific awards differ vastly from one another 
in terms of what component is most salient. Some awards are clearly competition 
prizes, while others more closely resemble feedback or praise. Some awards are 
valuable in monetary terms, while others come with neither monetary nor other 
material benefits. Enormous differences exist between state orders like the Medal of 
Freedom, the highest civilian order in the USA, and the Order of the Garter in the UK, 
that are governmental or monarchical acts, prizes granted by non-profits, foundations 
or clubs, such as the Service Above Self Award of the Rotary Club, and awards in for-
profit-companies such as the title Employee of the Month, to name just a few. But 
even within this large realm of awards there are considerable differences. Among 
state orders awards can be identified that convey legislative power, such as the title of 
a Lord among the British orders, whereas other orders are purely honorific, such as 
those that come with the title Knight. At the same time, awards may be similar in 
terms of monetary compensation and type of activity rewarded, such as the Nobel 
Prize and Balzan Prize in science, however, they differ greatly with respect to the 
social recognition and prestige they will bring to the recipient. In general, awards 
bestowed within private institutions including those in for-profit firms differ from 
other awards mainly in that the money coming with them is of greater importance. 
Nevertheless, managers clearly indicate that they use awards to give special 
recognition that goes above and beyond pure material compensation to chosen 
employees. In general, all awards serve as incentives, be it direct or indirect. Awards 
are direct incentives when they are announced ex ante to be granted for certain kinds 
of performances within a given period of time, such as the customer service award 
granted for the best customer service in the current year. Awards are indirect 
incentives when they stimulate other individuals to engage in similar tasks by 
establishing that this kind of behavior is deemed desirable, even when there is no 
hope of winning the award oneself in the future. Examples of awards with indirect 
incentive effects are state orders handed out for exceptional civil courage, such as 
saving lives. 
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In this paper, we refrain from distinguishing between different types of awards and 
treat all types of awards as representation of the phenomenon of interest. This is 
justified despite the mentioned differences as all awards share certain essential 
features that warrant the analysis of awards as one phenomenon. Among others, these 
features are that awards are always visible, be it via a public ceremony or because the 
award itself can be publicly displayed. Further, awards are associated with some form 
of social recognition, which can come either from peers or from the award-giving 
institution. Awards are handed out according to a broad and vague set of criteria. 
Typically, the various performance dimensions and how these are weighed to 
determine the winner are not clearly specified. Consider, for example, an award for 
exceptional customer service. It is typically not made explicit which specific 
behaviors (e.g. working overtime, being friendly, solving customer complaints) count 
towards winning the award and how much weight each of the relevant behaviors 
receives when the management decides on the award winner. One reason for vague 
award criteria may be that they prevent that employees only focus on the activities 
specified as being relevant for winning the award rather than on considering which 
behavior would be best in the situation at hand. Vague criteria also allow the 
management to adjust the set of relevant performance dimensions and weights ex post 
to the realized business situations. This leads to another feature of awards, namely the 
subjective element in determining the winner. Also, awards are not enforceable. 
While awards are typically handed out in a manner that makes the reasons for 
choosing the particular recipient(s) transparent, non-recipients cannot claim an award 
by trying to establish that their performance was better. A further characteristic of 
awards is the tournament character.  
These considerations suggest that awards perform important functions, and that 
awards can be defined according to a set of criteria despite the myriad of specific 
forms they take. Thus, awards can and should be studied as a unique phenomenon in 
psychology as well as in economics. This paper intends to introduce awards (a special 
from of incentives) as a field of investigation lying between psychology and 
economics, where insights from both disciplines help to better understand an 
interesting and relevant phenomenon. Section 2 presents several dimensions 
according to which awards differ from monetary incentives as these are the most 
widely used and discussed types of rewards. In section 3 we present some descriptive 
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evidence on the different intensity of award usage across 82 countries. Then, section 4 
presents the results of a vignette study on awards within companies, identifying the 
motivational aspects of awards in a business environment. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Differences between Awards and Monetary Compensation 
As monetary compensation is the type of reinforcer that is most extensively studied in 
both psychology and economics, it is worthwhile to highlight the differences between 
it and awards because these make it worthwhile to analyze awards separately.  
- The material costs of awards may be very low, or even nil, for the donor, but 
the value to the recipient may be very high.5  
- Awards are always made public. In the case of companies, award recipients 
are announced on the intranet, displayed on bulletin boards, or celebrated in a 
specially arranged ceremony. In contrast, the size of monetary compensations, 
i.e. salaries, tends to be hidden.  
- Accepting an award establishes a special relationship, in which the recipient 
owes (some measure of) loyalty to the donor. The respective contract is, 
however, tacit, incomplete, and difficult, or impossible, to enforce by the 
donor. Monetary compensation in contrast typically does not induce loyalty.  
- Awards are better incentive instruments than monetary payments when the 
recipients’ performance can be determined only vaguely. Criteria for awards 
are typically broad and not clearly specified. Therefore, performance can be 
globally evaluated ex post. Monetary compensation on the other hand almost 
always needs to be clearly specified contractually ex ante (Bandura, 1986).  
- Awards are of a social nature and, unlike pure monetary payments, they are 
less likely to destroy the signal value of actions requiring special commitment 
or of actions beyond what is typically expected. When payments are involved 
it is not clear for observers whether the behavior was driven by dedication and 
                                                 
5 Often, there is some monetary compensation tied to winning the award that entails 
corresponding costs to the giver. However, these costs are typically very low when compared 
with wage payments and can also be deducted from taxable profits. 
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commitment or solely by the money. In principle, the same could hold for 
awards. However, because awards are less powerful extrinsic incentives, the 
signal value of special behaviors is reduced less (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003).  
- Awards are not taxed, while monetary income is. In countries with high 
marginal taxes it is therefore relatively more attractive to receive an untaxed 
award than to receive a highly taxed monetary compensation. 
These considerations make clear that there are indeed many major differences 
between awards and monetary compensation well worth inquiring into. 
 
3. Awards in an International Comparison 
One approach to study awards is their analysis across countries. The factors that 
render an award important or unimportant in a country, be it as an incentive, as a 
visible symbol of social recognition, or as a signal of one’s ability or motivation to 
outside parties can be identified. A major problem confronting researchers trying to 
systematically analyze awards across countries is the lack of internationally 
comparative data. Wikipedia is the only source that offers an extensive list of prizes, 
medals and awards across many different countries.6 As is well known, this source is 
of a somewhat doubtful quality, and it is quite obvious that some countries are 
covered more completely than others. In view of this data problem, we turn to 
individuals’ own reports to identify how many awards they possess. We use the 
awards specified by individuals in the International Who’s Who (IWW) (Neil, 2006), 
a work of reference comprising a list of the most important personalities in 212 
countries. The persons included are, for example, every head of state, all directors of 
international organizations, heads of leading universities, CEOs of the Global 500 and 
Fortune 500 companies, prize winners of distinguished awards (such as the Nobel 
Prize and the Pulitzer Prize), important sports personalities as well as prominent 
individuals from the film and television industry. The data source provides 
information on person-specific characteristics such as nationality, occupation, and age 
as well as information about the number and kinds of awards each person has 
                                                 
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prizes%2C_medals%2C_and_awards, accessed 15 May 
2008. 
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received. For a sub-sample of 82 countries, we coded the available information for a 
random set of 50 individuals per country.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In order to document the importance of awards in a globalized world, Table 1 shows 
the average number of awards handed out per country per individual sampled. The 
table lists the total number of awards as well as two specific, and very different types 
of awards: domestic state awards (such as orders or prizes handed out by national and 
subnational executive organs) and business awards (such as “Manager of the Year” or 
“Business Executive of the Month”). In addition to the average and variance over all 
82 countries, the five countries with the highest average, and the five countries with 
the lowest average, are listed. In addition, information on all three categories is 
provided for the United States and Canada, and for the large European countries 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and Italy. 
This “elite” of persons (as defined by the International Who’s Who) lists, on average, 
between 2 and 3 awards per person. The largest number of awards per person is given 
for three Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the UK, and Australia) as well as for 
Poland and Senegal averaging between 5 and 7 awards. The lowest average numbers 
of awards per person are reported for some small South American, African and Asian 
countries (such as El Salvador and Tanzania) with substantially less than 1 award per 
person.  
The average number of awards per member of the elite (3.8) in the United States is 
considerably higher than the average of 2.7 over all 82 countries. Americans thus 
seem to enjoy bestowing and receiving awards. Awards are of a similar importance in 
France and Spain (3.6 and 4.2, respectively). This is surpassed by Canada and the 
United Kingdom (6.8). As can be inferred from the high numbers of awards handed 
out in such staunch republics as the United States and France, awards are not only a 
matter of tradition, or monarchic regimes. Rather, the data indicate that awards are of 
importance and general relevance today in many countries of the world. 
The ranking of the countries with respect to the average number of awards changes 
when awards bestowed by national governments (in particular national orders, medals 
and decorations) are considered. Not surprisingly, the average number of national 
government awards received by the individuals listed in the International Who’s Who 
is much lower (less than every second individual sampled received such an award). 
 11
Also, different countries now lead the list of handing out the highest numbers of 
awards per person (except for Poland which heads the list in this award category). The 
top five are now comprised of Poland, France, Tunisia, Egypt and Malaysia. The 
smallest numbers of these awards are bestowed by a similar set of nations as the 
overall number of awards. Switzerland joins the ranks because the nation – as the only 
country in the world - does not bestow any governmental awards (not even to its 
soldiers). There is one individual in the data set with an honorary citizenship from 
Lausanne, Switzerland that causes the coefficient to be greater than zero.  
Business awards have, of course, a quite different character from national government 
awards. They refer to awards handed out for private sector activities and comprise 
honors such as ”Most Powerful Woman”, “Manager of the Year”, or “Arabian 
Business Achievement Award”. On average, only few persons in the International 
Who’s Who elite indicate such awards (the average number of business awards per 
person is 0.06 over all countries).7 The largest number of business awards goes, on 
average, to persons in three Anglos-Saxon countries (Canada, the United States and 
Australia), to individuals in Singapore, and in Saudi Arabia. In a considerable number 
of countries (33 of the 82 countries in the sample) no business awards are reported. 
In the United States, the awards are divided very unequally between national 
governmental awards and business awards: with respect to domestic state awards US-
Americans are clearly below average in international comparison,8 but for business 
awards they are nearly at the top. With an average number of awards per person far 
above the worldwide average, this suggests that in the US the large number of 
business awards compensates for the small number of state awards. A different 
pattern holds, for instance, in Canada. In that country, both the number of domestic 
state awards as well as the number of business awards a person in the Who’s Who 
indicates are above average. The large European countries France, Germany, Spain, 
and UK rank above average with respect to national government awards (between 0.5 
and 1.3), and below average with respect to business awards (between 0.04 and 0.06). 
These findings are consistent with the notion that in the United States business affairs 
                                                 
7 This may be due to the way the International Who’s Who defines its “elite”. Business 
persons, and hence the persons most likely to receive business awards may be 
underrepresented since only CEOs and CFOs of the top 500 companies world-wide and the 
top 500 US companies are included in the book.  
8 In the United States, there are only three civilian awards handed out by the federal 
government: the Congressional Gold Medal, the Presidential Medal of Freedom, and the 
Presidential Citizens Medal. 
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are of central social importance while in European and Commonwealth countries 
awards bestowed by the state are held in great esteem. 
Awards are handed out for activities in many different areas. The largest share of 
awards is bestowed to persons for activities that can be broadly summarized as 
belonging into the category Social Welfare (37%). This category includes awards such 
as state orders and peace prizes. This large proportion of awards for social welfare can 
be attributed to the fact that these activities – while being socially desirable – are 
often not or only inadequately compensated in monetary terms. At the same time, 
monetary compensation could even be counterproductive as means of rewarding these 
kinds of behaviors (see e.g. the literature on motivation crowding (Frey, 1997) or 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2004)). Individuals working in Academia receive the second 
highest share of awards (32%). These data suggest that individuals in the scientific 
sector, though a place of rational discourse, are quite happy to receive awards. A 
significant, but clearly lower, share of awards (19%) is bestowed in the Cultural 
Sector. The same arguments that explain the intensive use of awards in the Social 
Welfare sector may be adduced here. In addition, the Cultural Sector, which includes 
film, television and writing, is particularly skillful in using the media to promote its 
own importance. This is reflected in the great attention received by the award 
ceremonies such as for the Oscars, Grammies, Emmy Awards, or the Pulitzer or 
Brooker Prizes.  
 
4. Awards in Companies: a Vignette Experiment 
4.1. The Setting 
This section presents an overview over our survey experiment on awards as incentives 
in principal-agent relationships. Further details on the relevant theories, the design, 
and the statistical analyses are presented in Neckermann & Frey (2007). The vignette 
study was conducted online during a two-week period in January/February 07 with 
the employees of the IBM research laboratory in Rüschlikon, Switzerland. The 
facility has 255 employees, 177 of which are researchers from more than 20 different 
nations (primarily from European countries). The lab in Rüschlikon is one of the eight 
labs that IBM operates worldwide with about 3’550 employees total. In collaboration 
with clients and universities, researchers at these labs conduct basic as well as applied 
research in chemistry, information technology, physics, electrical engineering, and 
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material science among others. To date, four researchers have been awarded Nobel 
prizes in physics for research they conducted during their time at the IBM lab in 
Rüschlikon. The management hands out the approximately 20 different awards that 
are available in all IBM research labs. The awards are broadly divided into two main 
categories: formal and informal awards. Formal awards recognize outstanding 
scientific contributions and innovations and they are rewarded with substantial 
monetary compensations. Recipients of these awards are always announced on the 
worldwide intranet of IBM research and have the possibility to move up an award 
ladder, which culminates in either the admission into the IBM academy (about 500 
persons worldwide) or in the nomination as an IBM Fellow (about 40 persons 
worldwide). Informal awards, on the other hand, honor exceptional motivation in 
general; examples are contributions to teams, knowledge sharing, passion for work, 
and customer service. According to the human resource manager at IBM Rüschlikon, 
informal awards are also used to motivate researchers during times in which no major 
scientific breakthrough is impending. Informal awards are typically rewarded with 
smaller monetary bonuses or gifts such as vouchers for dinners or weekend city trips. 
Only the more important informal awards are publicized on the local intranet of the 
Rüschlikon lab. Given this large number of established awards at IBM, the 
respondents to this study can be assumed to be familiar with their own behavior and 
feelings with respect to striving for and receiving awards. This is an advantage for this 
study, because it increases reliability and predictive power of our findings.  
The survey uses the vignette study technique9 and analyzes the quantitative effect of 
introducing a new award at IBM on stated work behavior and analyzes which award 
characteristics determine the size of the effect. In vignette studies, subjects are 
presented with scenarios in which several factors of interest are systematically varied 
by the researcher and asked how they would feel or behave in the presented scenario. 
Thereby, the research can elicit the responsiveness of the answers to variations in the 
factors of interest. In our study, the behavioral response of the employees is measured 
via a question asking about the willingness to immediately share an important finding 
with one’s team10 in their current work environment as well as in four different 
                                                 
9 For a general introduction into the method and further methodological information see Rossi 
& Anderson (1982). 
10 Specifically, we inquired into their willingness to share an important finding with their 
work group. Sharing increases team productivity, but entails the risk of losing part or all of 
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scenarios each of which represented the introduction of a new award for international 
cooperation at IBM. The awards differed with respect to whether they were 
accompanied by cash bonuses or gifts, the monetary value of the bonus or gift, the 
number of award recipients, and the degree of publicity associated with winning the 
award. Further, we simulated a situation in which the respondents were told that they 
either did or did not receive the award. This addresses the question about the behavior 
of both winners and losers upon the receipt of an award.  
4.2. Design of the Study  
4.2.1. Independent Variables: The Award Characteristics 
Each vignette describes the introduction of a new incentive for all employees at the 
IBM research lab in Rüschlikon. All vignettes, i.e. reward description are identical in 
their basic set-up; they only differ in the realized values of the five different reward 
characteristics, which we analyze. Those five independent reward characteristics have 
been chosen according to theoretical considerations on the effectiveness of rewards. 
1) The incentive is framed either as a purely monetary bonus or as an award. The 
difference is that the former is completely deprived of any social component. That 
social rewards in the form of praise, feedback or social recognition matter has been 
clearly documented in the psychological literature whereas these effects have been 
largely ignored in economics. In scenarios in which the incentive is framed as a 
monetary bonus, the management decides who will receive the bonus without any 
employee participation in the nomination process. The money is subsequently 
transferred to the selected employee’s bank account together with the next paycheck 
without any explanation. The winners are neither specifically notified nor 
congratulated by the management. If the incentive is framed as an award the opposite 
holds. Since we assume that the social approval associated with winning an award 
matters, we expect to find a larger behavioral response to the introduction of an award 
as compared to the introduction of a monetary bonus.  
2) In the vignette, the reward is randomly described as being accompanied with a cash 
payment or a non-monetary gift. In case the reward was framed as a monetary bonus 
it always came with cash. For this factor there are two opposing behavioral 
                                                                                                                                            
the personal scientific credit that a researcher would certainly receive when publishing the 
finding first and only sharing it with the team later. 
 15
predictions. On the one hand, standard economic theory predicts that cash should 
work better than a gift because it is fungible (Waldfogel, 1993). On the other hand, 
the psychological and management literature cites a number of reasons why a gift 
should work better than cash (Jeffrey & Shaffer, 2007). Examples of such reasons are 
evaluability (the perceived value of the gift is higher than its actual value) and 
justifiability (recipients value the gift more than the equivalent payment in cash, but 
would not have bought it for themselves; e.g. luxuries).  
3) In the vignettes, the degree of publicity is varied among three different types. First, 
the list of recipients remains undisclosed. Second, the list of recipients is published on 
the intranet. Third, in addition to publicizing the list of recipients on the intranet, the 
company arranges a formal ceremony in which the award is handed to the recipients. 
In case the incentive is framed as a monetary bonus, the third type of publicity 
involving the ceremony is excluded, as this would not have been realistic. Since status 
and social recognition can only be gained, and hence make their documented impact, 
when others know about the reward, we hypothesize that the effect of a reward is 
greater when it is publicized. Further, the effect should be even greater when there is a 
ceremony in addition to the announcement of the winners on the intranet as ceremony 
adds a more immediate personal component of recognition by colleagues.  
4) The value of the accompanying cash payment or gift was varied between CHF 0 
and CHF 10’000.11 In line with standard economic theory and psychological 
reinforcement theories, we hypothesize that the behavioral impact of the reward 
increases with its monetary value. 
5) We varied the maximum number of award recipients per year between 1, 2, 6, 10, 
16, and 20.12 The number of recipients is an interesting variable because the value of 
an award changes with its scarcity (Gavrila, Caulkins, Feichtinger, Tragler, & Hartl, 
2005). The effect of a reward should therefore decrease with the number of recipients. 
However, there is a countervailing effect as an increase in the number of reward 
recipients ceteris paribus increases the chances of an individual employee to be a 
                                                 
11 The set of possible values was CHF 0, CHF 50, CHF 150, CHF 300, CHF 1’000, CHF 
2’000, CHF 4’000, CHF 6’000, CHF 8’000, and CHF 10’000 (about the same amounts in 
US$). In the statistical analysis, monetary value was treated as a continuous variable. Hence, 
the number of observations necessary to reliably estimate the effect can be substantially lower 
than if the variable was categorical. 
12 Like the monetary value of the reward, the number of recipients is treated as a continuous 
variable in the statistical analysis. 
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winner. Therefore, we hypothesize an inversely u-shaped relationship between the 
number of recipients and motivation. As long as the quality of the award is not diluted 
by too high a number of recipients, additional recipients will increase effort by raising 
perceived chances of winning the award. Beyond a certain threshold number of 
recipients, the negative effect of decreased reward quality outweighs the positive 
effect of an increase in chances to win.  
4.2.2. Operationalization of the Dependent Variable 
Following the reward introduction scenarios, the subjects were asked to indicate their 
behavior in a public good situation, i.e. a situation in which subjects face a trade-off 
between individual and collective benefit. In particular, we asked about their 
willingness to share an important finding with their team before publishing it under 
their own name. They were told that sharing the finding now would increase the 
quality and speed of the team project, but expose them to the personal risk that the 
finding could be used and published without giving them the appropriate credit for the 
discovery. Alternatively, they could wait and publish the finding in a scientific journal 
under their own name before sharing it with the team colleagues. Respondents marked 
their willingness on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 meaning "I definitely would not 
share now." to 10 meaning "I would certainly share now." Employees were familiar 
with this type of public good situation in their everyday work life as was confirmed in 
interviews preceding the study. In the survey about 84% of the respondents rated the 
situation description as realistic or very realistic. The rewards are granted for 
extraordinary efforts with respect to cooperation on international work teams with 
members from different nations. Hence, the behavior in the public good situation is 
relevant for winning the award. 
4.2.3.  Procedure 
After specifying the dimensions (award characteristics) and their values, each vignette 
was constructed by choosing one combination of values for each of the five 
independent dimensions. For each participant, the vignettes were sampled without 
replacement from the pool of all possible vignettes. The total pool comprises all 
possible combinations of values in the five dimensions that characterize each reward, 
i.e. 720 different vignettes. It is not important that all possible vignettes are actually 
answered as long as the levels of the different factors are uncorrelated and there is 
sufficient variation in the vignettes drawn. In the sample of vignettes drawn in our 
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study both of these conditions are met. Further, two of our dimensions (value in CHF 
and number of participants) are treated as quantitative, which significantly reduces 
the number of observations necessary to reliably estimate the impact of these factors. 
A number of combinations were excluded for plausibility reasons such as those 
vignettes that combine a monetary bonus (factor 1: framing) and a ceremony (factor 
4: publicity), or cash payments (factor 2: associated reward) of zero value (factor 4: 
value in CHF).  
To control for individual specific effects we generated multiple observations per 
person by presenting each subject with four different reward scenarios. While the 
assignment of vignettes to individual respondents was random, we ensured that the 4 
award descriptions each subject was confronted with differed in terms of factor levels 
(e.g. we ensured that each person received one award with zero, small, medium, and 
high monetary value). Further, each person received at least one bonus, one award 
with a cash payment, and one award with a gift. This was necessary to ensure that 
subjects were not confused by the potential close similarity of award realizations 
caused by a purely random assignment. Further, we randomized the order in which 
the different factors appeared in the award description to control for order effects 
(only the type of reward - bonus or award - always remained at the beginning of the 
vignette). Hence, each participant was presented with a random set of 4 different 
reward descriptions, i.e. combinations of scenarios, out of the total pool of vignettes 
that was balanced with respect to content and order according to our experimental 
design. 
Before introducing the scenarios, we asked the respondents to state their willingness 
to share the finding assuming they were working in their current work environment 
(status quo). This gives us the baseline motivation of each respondent. Then subjects 
were confronted with the vignettes, i.e. the reward introduction scenarios and were 
asked to indicate in each of them their willingness to share their finding. After having 
stated their motivation in the public good situation after the fourth award vignette, we 
described a scenario in which the individual either did or did not receive the reward 
that was described to them as reward 4. Then we asked them again to indicate how 
willing they were to share the finding now that they knew whether they had received 
reward 4 or not. As the reaction to receiving or not receiving the award requires 
subjects to put themselves in this situation emotionally and as we expected that 
 18
respondents would only reliably do this once, we only asked this question once and 
used a between-subject design to study the impact of (not) receiving an award. In 
order to diminish effects of impression management or self-deception, one could have 
asked how a colleague would respond in such a situation. However, our pretest 
revealed that the researchers resisted the question in this manner. The questionnaire 
ended with a survey section in which respondents were asked questions about their 
perception on the role of awards in organizations and the determinants of award 
effectiveness in motivating employees. Further, we inquired personal characteristics 
such as gender, age, and award history at IBM. These questions were the same for all 
participants.  
4.2.4. Discussion of the effect of the different award characteristics  
During the survey period, 52 out of 177 researchers completed the online 
questionnaire, resulting in a rate of return of 30%. The respondents are representative 
of the workforce with respect to all objective criteria available from the company.13 
According to our design about one third of the 208 realized vignettes were framed as 
bonuses and two thirds as awards, there were approximately the same numbers of 
realized combinations including associated rewards of small, medium and high value 
and with few, medium and a high number of recipients. Further, there is an 
approximately equal distribution of the type of publicity and form of associated 
reward (gift or cash). The results described in this section refer to the ceteris paribus 
impact of individual award characteristics as estimated in OLS regressions with 
random effects controlling for individual fixed effects. Included in the regression are 
the five reward characteristics, the random effects, a constant and the stated baseline 
willingness to share the finding. There are a total of 208 observations from the 52 
respondents. The coefficient of determination, R Square, equals 0.78.  
The monetary value of the reward has a robust, significant, and positive impact on the 
willingness to share the finding. We ran a second regression that is identical to the one 
described above apart from the fact that we included dummy variables for whether the 
value of the reward in CHF was zero, small, medium, or high. It turns out that CHF 
zero and small monetary values do not have a significantly different impact on 
                                                 
13 Average age, percentage of female workforce, and length of employment at IBM are 41 
years, 13.2%, and 12 years among the workforce of the IBM lab in Rüschlikon and 42 years, 
10%, and 12 years in our sample of respondents. 
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motivation. The same is true for medium and high values. Compared to the latter, 
CHF zero or small monetary values lead to a motivation that is approximately half a 
point lower on a 10-point scale. The differences of 0.52 and 0.54 are statistically 
significant with standard deviations of 0.21 each. In the qualitative survey conducted 
after the vignette study, the responding employees confirmed the importance of the 
monetary value of rewards. Almost all indicated that they considered it to be essential 
for an award to be accompanied by a substantial monetary bonus.  
Publicity has a significant positive effect on stated contributions to the public good. 
As compared to a situation with no publicity, contributions are on average 0.44 points 
(standard deviation 0.2) higher when publicity is involved, which is substantial. 
Naming the recipients and having a ceremony increases contributions by as much as 
increasing the value of the award from CHF 0 to about CHF 1’000. The coefficient of 
having a ceremony and announcing the winners on the intranet is substantially larger 
than the coefficient of an announcement on the intranet alone. Hence, the larger 
coefficient on the combination of intranet and ceremony indicates that employees 
value the ceremony per se. 
For a given monetary value, gifts works less well than payments in cash. Holding the 
value of the reward constant, a gift leads to a willingness that is 0.3 points (standard 
deviation 0.17) lower than the willingness induced by an equivalent payment in cash. 
For a gift to induce the same willingness to share as a payment in cash of CHF 50, it 
needs to increase in value from CHF 50 to CHF 2’000. This is in line with remarks by 
the respondents in the last part of the questionnaire. In the comment section a 
substantial number stated that they preferred money or paid vacation to other kinds of 
prizes.  
We do not find a significant effect of the factor ‘type of reward’. The pure framing of 
the reward as a bonus that is transferred to the employees’ bank account without any 
social recognition or as an award that is associated with either a gift or a cash payment 
ceteris paribus does not make a difference on the motivation of the employees. Also 
the number of recipients does not have an effect that is significantly different from 
zero. The baseline motivation has a highly significant positive effect on the 
willingness to share the finding. The coefficient of 0.9 implies that a person with a 1-
point higher willingness to share the finding in the current work environment is about 
0.9-points more willing to share the finding after incentives have been introduced. 
 20
Demographic variables such as age, gender, and experience with international teams 
do not play a role. The same holds for the award history of the participants, i.e. the 
number and value of the IBM awards received in the past.  
The analysis shows that in a public good situation that participants were well familiar 
with in their work experience, awards have significant and systematic effects on the 
stated contributions of employees. 
4.2.5. The Effect of Receiving or Not Receiving an Incentive 
The design of the vignette allows studying how people react when they receive or do 
not receive a reward. Both economic and psychological theory do not allow for a clear 
behavioral prediction on this reaction in general as well as with respect to the 
particular design of this experiment. Economic status models, for instance, suggest 
that a representative agent’s equilibrium effort level depends positively on his or her 
status (Auriol & Renault, 2008). Because receiving an award increases relative 
standing, these models predict that winners increase and non-recipients decrease their 
effort. Winners can also be expected to increase their performance, when the positive 
feedback or the social recognition associated with winning increases motivation as 
psychological literature suggests (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999). At the same time, 
however, the incentive effect, i.e. the motivational power that comes with the prospect 
of winning the reward next time is typically smaller or zero for winners, but should be 
undiminished for the non-recipients. On the other hand, non-recipients might be 
frustrated or disappointed and therefore decrease their performance.   
Subsequent to scenario 4, half the subjects were asked to imagine that they do receive 
the reward that was described to them in scenario 4, while the other half of the 
participants was asked to imagine that they learn that they do not receive it. Then, 
they were asked how willing they were to share the finding now. Again, we ran a 
random-effects OLS regression including the individual random effects, a constant, 
the five reward characteristics, the baseline motivation, the motivation as indicated in 
scenario 4, and a dummy for whether the person is a winner or a non-recipient. It 
turns out the contribution of winners exceeds the one of non-recipients by 0.71 
(standard deviation 0.31) on a 10-point scale, which is substantial. In fact, 
contributions of non-recipients fall below their original baseline willingness to share. 
This draws attention to the importance of considering the effects of rewards on 
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behavior after conferral and not only their incentive effects. Persons showing a higher 
baseline motivation and those that indicated a high willingness to share their finding 
after award introduction in scenario 4 are more willing to share the finding after 
conferral independently of whether they receive the reward or not. The award 
characteristics do neither have a significant direct effect on the motivation after 
conferral other than via the willingness stated after the introduction of the incentive 
nor do they have a differentiated effect on winners and non-recipients.  
4.2.6.  Evaluation 
Awards combine a multitude of stimuli such as feedback, information and social 
recognition in a unique way. With the vignette study technique we can identify the 
effects of individual award characteristics, while not artificially restricting the number 
of award characteristics present. Specifically, the effect of rewards is increased by the 
degree of publicity associated with winning the award and by the monetary value of 
the reward. Further, rewards at IBM work better when they are accompanied by a 
payment in cash rather than a gift. Further, the study shows that it is important to also 
consider the effect of awards after conferral as it was shown that non-recipients 
substantially decrease their contributions even if the award is granted yearly and 
hence open to them in the future. Winners, on the other hand, increase their 
contributions even further. As we use this real world subject pool, the results allow an 
inference of how the IBM workforce would behave in case IBM were indeed to 
introduce the suggested award for international cooperation.  
In general, one has, of course, to be aware of the advantages and shortcomings of the 
vignette technique. Advantages are that reports are typically more reliable and less 
biased than traditional survey methods (Alexander & Becker, 1978) as they present 
subjects with a stimulus that is precisely specified and that closely resembles real-life 
decision-making situations. In particular, respondents evaluate a complete situation 
description (bundle of different factors), rather than having to state how isolated 
factors influence their behavior. This is cognitively less challenging and more natural 
for the respondents and decreases the risk that respondents consciously bias their 
answers towards socially desirable responses. Among other studies, Telser and 
Zweifel (2007) show the external validity of survey experiments by comparing stated 
choices in their experiment with actual choices made by the same individuals. 
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Moreover, results from vignette studies have been shown to be reliable over time 
(measurements are taken and then repeated at a subsequent point in time), over 
attribute sets (effect of one set of factors is examined as other factors are varied), and 
over data collection methods (Bateson, Reibstein, & Boudling, 1987). Vignette 
studies exhibit a degree of uniformity and control over the stimulus situation 
approximating that achieved by researchers using laboratory experimental designs. 
However, vignettes do only elicit stated rather than actual behaviors.14 Hence, a 
comparison with results from field or laboratory studies is indispensable. 
Neckermann, Cueni, and Frey (2008), Neckermann, Kosfeld, and Frey (2008), and 
Markham, Scott, and McKee (2002) corroborate the findings from this study with 
field evidence and show that formal recognition programs have an impact on 
employee performance. Peterson and Luthans (2006) document the impact of 
financial and nonfinancial incentives on business-unit outcomes over time.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Awards are a relevant phenomenon deserving the attention of both psychologists and 
economists. This paper presents three distinct approaches to awards. First, we 
demonstrate that awards cannot be equated with monetary compensation. Second, we 
present empirical evidence on the difference in the intensity with which awards are 
used across countries. Third, we present the results of a vignette study showing that 
awards substantially and systematically change stated work behavior. While this 
paper raises some interesting aspects, a general theory of awards still needs to be 
developed.  
                                                 
14 Shortcoming of survey data in general are discussed in Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001). 
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Table 1 
Average Number of Awards per Individual per Country  
Total Awards Domestic State Awards Business Awards 
Mean 2.66 Mean 0.43 Mean 0.06 
Variance  1.96 Variance  0.11 Variance  0.01 
Top 5 countries in each category:    
Canada 6.82 Poland 1.78 Canada 0.52 
UK 6.78 France 1.32 Singapore 0.46 
Poland 6.16 Tunisia 1.05 USA 0.34 
Australia 5.66 Egypt 1.02 Saudi Arabia 0.27 
Senegal 5.30 Malaysia 1.00 Australia 0.26 
Lowest 5 countries in each category:    
Honduras 0.83 Nicaragua 0.05 Trinidad & Tobego 0.00 
Bangladesh 0.78 Honduras 0.04 Uganda 0.00 
Uganda 0.76 Uruguay 0.04 Ukraine 0.00 
Tanzania 0.62 Switzerland 0.02 Uruguay 0.00 
El Salvador 0.30 El Salvador 0.00 Venezuela 0.00 
Information on 7 additional countries:    
USA 3.80  0.22  0.34 
Canada 6.82  0.86  0.52 
UK 6.78  0.78  0.04 
France 3.60  1.32  0.04 
Germany 2.46  0.48  0.06 
Spain 4.20  0.70  0.06 
Italy 1.96   0.22   0.04 
Source: Own calculations using data constructed from the International Who’s Who 2007 (Neil 2006) 
 
 
